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1. 	 Focus as a Source of Semantic Partition 
Recent work on the semantics of natural language has shown that instances of 
quantification can be analyzed in terms of relations between two predicate mean-
ings. That is, quantifications involve so-called TRIPARTITE STRUCTURES, 
consisting of a QUANTIFIER that identifies the relation, a RESTRICTOR as its 
first argument, and a MATRIX as its second argument. The prototypical case are 
quantificational NPs like (1 ), where the determiner, here most, is the quantifier, 
the noun, here frogs, is the restrictor, and the verbal predicate, here croaked, is the 
matrix: 
(I) 	 Most frogs croaked 
MOST({xlfrog(x)l)({xlcroak(x)l), with MOST AXAY[#(XnY) > 1/ #{X)J2
Tripartite structures can also be identified with adverbial quantification: 
(2) 	 Mostly/ Most of the time, if a frog is happy, it croaks 
MOST({ <s,x>lfrog(x) & happy(x,s) l )( {<s,x>lcroak(x,s) I) 
We have to assume that (2) contains both a quantification over objects and over 
situations; this is implemented as a quantification over PAIRS of entities x and 
situations s. Quantifications over more than one entity are called quantification 
over CASES, following Lewis (1975). In the example at hand, the quantifier is an 
adverbial, the restrictor is supplied by the if-clause, and the matrix is given by the 
matrix clause. 
Other cases of quantification, for example by verbal affixes, have been 
identified in the Amherst project on quantification (Bach, Kratzer, Partee 1989; 
Partee 1991). I should mention that the quantifier may be implicit, as in If a frog 
is happy, it croaks. In such cases, the inherent quantifier is the generic operator 
(cf. Kritka e.a., to appear), which can be interpreted as a quantifier with a modal 
component. In this article I will concentrate on non-generic cases in order to avoid 
additional complications involving quantification over possible worlds. 
An obvious question at this point is how the mapping of semantic material 
of a quantificational expression to the restrictor and the matrix, respectively, is 
grammatically determined. This mapping, which has come to be called 
SEMANTIC PARTITION (cf. Diesing 1990), may depend on a range of different 
factors. For example, one obvious source is PHRASE STRUCTURE. In the case 
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of quantificational NPs like most frogs, the nominal predicate, here frogs, forms 
the restrictor, and the matrix is detennined by general scoping rules for quantified 
NPs -- in the simple case of (1), it is the VP. Another source for semantic partition 
are special SYNTACTIC OR MORPHOLOGICAL MARKERS, like the if of 
conditional sentences: it marks the clause that it c-commands as restrictor (cf. 2). 
Another way to mark semantic partition is FOCUS, which is typically 
marked by sentence accent in languages like English, cf. Rooth (1985), also 
Newton (1979) and Schubert & Pelletier (1989) for generic sentences. In general, 
expressions that are in focus are mapped to the matrix. This effect shows up in the 
following minimal pair discussed by Rooth: 
(3) a. [In St. Petersburg], OFFICERSF always escorted ballerinas. 
EVERY( { sl:lx:ly[ escorted(x,y,s) & ballerina(y)]}) 
({sl:lx:ly[officer(x) & escorted(x,y,s) & ballerina(y)])) 
b. [In St. Petersburg], officers always escorted BALLERINAS!'" 
EVERY({sl:lx:ly[officer(x) & escorted(x,y,s)])) 
( { sl:lx:ly[ officer(x) & escorted(x,y,s) & ballerina(y)]}) 
In this article, I will concentrate on focus. See Krifka (1992) for a discussion of 
other sources of semantic partition, like article choice, case marking, word order, 
scrambling, and context). 
2. Rooth's Treatment of Focus-Sensitive Quantification 
In this section, I will discuss Rooth's theory of focus-sensitive quantification and 
some of its problems. 
We assume that focus is represented by a feature F that applies to syntactic 
constituents and may be spelled out by sentence accent on certain syllables of 
certain words of the constituent in focus. The constituent in focus may be 
associated with a focusing operator such as only that c-commands its focus. Focus 
marking by sentence accent is often ambigous, as shown with the following 
example, where the main accent is on Sue: 
(4) 	 John only introduced Bill to SUE. 
a. 	 John only introduced Bill to [SUE]F 
"John introduced Bill to Sue and to no one else" 
b. 	 John only [introduced Bill to SUE]F 
"John introduced Bill to Sue and did nothing else" 
In Rooth' s theory, semantic representations consist of two parts, the usual 
meaning, and a set of alternatives (therefore we may call it ALTERNATIVE 
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SEMANTICS, following von Stechow 1989). The set of alternatives is generated 
by the expression(s) in focus. 
For example, in the (a) reading of (4) the alternatives to the item in focus, 
Sue, is a set ALT(s). This set of alternatives generates alternative sets for more 
comprehensive expressions in a compositional way. The alternative set for (4.a) 
without the operator only then is the set of propositions given in (5.a). In a similar 
way, the alternative set for (4.b) without only can be derived as (5.b): 
(5) a. John introduced Bill to [SUE/F 
Meaning: introduce(j,s,b). 
Alternatives: {pl3x[xE ALT(s) & p=introduced(j,x,b)]} 
b. John [introduced Bill to SUEJF 
Meaning: same as in (a) 
Alternatives: {pl3P[PE ALT(h.introduced(x,s,b)) & p=PU) J} 
The operator ONLY simply states that the meaning itself is the only element 
in the set of alternatives that is true. (Actually. Rooth allows for focusing 
operators to be combined with VP-meanings. As in the preceding section, I will 
restrict the discussion here to focusing operators that take sentential scope; the 
generalization to other types is straightforward.) 
(6) ONLY(M,A) iff true(M) & Vp[pE A & true(p) -t p=M] 
Let us now turn to Rooth 's treatment of focus-sensitive quantification. In 
Rooth (1985), he only treats cases that imply quantifications over situations 
(which he captures by quantifications over times, following Stump 1981). He 
assumes that episodic sentences are true of situations. Then the meaning of a 
sentence like (7.a) can be described as the set of situations in which Mary took 
John to the movies (.7b). Applied to a specific situation si' it is expressed that si is 
a situation in which Mary took John to the movies (7.c). 
(7) a. 	 Mary took John to the movies. 
b. { sltook(mj,s)} 
c. si E ( sltook(mj,s)) 
Focus on John will create the following representation: 
8. 	 Mary took [JOHN]F to the movies. 
Meaning: As above, (b) 
Alternatives: { S13x[xE ALT(j) & S={ sltook(m,x,s)) JI 
Focus-sensitive quantifiers relate the set of alternatives to the meaning. More 
precisely, they can be spelled out as quantifiers with the union of alternatives in 
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the restrictor, and the meaning in the matrix. For example: 
(9) 	 most of the time, applied to meaning Mand alternative set A: 
MOST(UA)(M). 
Let us look at one example: 
(10) 	 Most of the time, Mary took [JOHNJF to the movies. 
MOST(U { S13x[xE ALT(j)& S={ sltook(m.x,s))]) )({ sltook(mj,s) }) 
= MOST({ sl3x[xE ALT(i) & took(m,x,s)]})({sltook(mj,s) )) 
(10) can be paraphrased as: "In most situations in which Mary took an alternative 
to John to the movies, she took John to the movies". The context may provide a 
set of alternatives. If it does not. we can assume that the alternatives are the set of 
all suitable entities of the type of the expression in focus. For example, the 
alternatives of j will be the set of all individuals. In this case, the meaning of our 
example reduces to: 
( 11) MOST( {sl3x.took(m,x,s)} )( {sltook(m,j,s) l) 
Rooth' s reconstruction of adverbial quantification seems to be a good starting 
point. However, there are several problems with it. 
One problem is that the generated readings often seem to be too liberal, 
which Rooth himself sees as a "possible point of dispute" (p. 173). There is an 
interpretation of (10) where this sentence is true if, and only if, in most cases in 
which Mary took someone to the movies she took John and no one else. The 
phenomenon is obviously related to the exhaustive interpretation we often find 
with sentences containing a focus. 
One way to handle this problem is to treat exhaustivity by assuming 
pragmatic interpretation rules that can be spelled out by ONLY. In the case of 
sentences with the adverbial quantifier most of the time, we would like to get 
something like the following interpretation instead of (9): 
(12) MOST(UA)(ONLY(M,A)) 
That is, most situations that are in the union of the alternatives are such that the 
meaning is the only one among the alternatives that holds for them. To get the 
types right, ONLY(M,A) must be interpreted as a set of situations. The definition 
that comes to mind is the following one: 
(13) ONLY(M,A) = {slsE M & \fS[SE A & SES -? S=M] I 
That is, ONLY(M,A) holds for situations s that satisfy the meaning M, but no 
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proper alternative to it. It seems that (13) is a straightforward reformulation of (6) 
in the new, situation-based framework. However, it does not capture the meaning 
of only or the exhaustive interpretation. This shows up in examples like the 
following one: 
(14) Mary took JOHN to the movies. 
(sltook(m,j,s) & 
'v'S[3x[ XE ALT(i) & S=I sltook(m,x,s)J] ~ S={ sltook(m,j,s) Ill 
={ sltook(m,j,s)&'v's'[3x(xe ALT(j)&took(m,x,s')J-took(mj,s') JJ} 
This applies to situations s in which Mary took John to the movies, and for which 
it holds that for every situation s' where Mary took some alternative to John to the 
movies, she took John to the movies. Now, the most natural interpretation of the 
conditions for s' is that Mary can take more than one person to the movies at the 
same occasion, that is, it is possible that took(m,j,s') and took(m,b,s') for the 
same situations'. But then (13), and consequently (12), cannot give us the re-
quired exhaustive interpretation. In order to arrive at a more adequate representa-
tion we would need to refer to the content of the item in focus and say that it is the 
only one among the alternatives that satisfies the proposition. But this is not 
possible in Rooth' s framework, where we cannot refer to the meaning contribu-
tion of the focus directly. 
Another problem is that we may have anaphoric bindings between the 
restrictor and the matrix: 
(15) Most of the time, a frog that sees a fly tries to CATCH it. 
MOST( Is13x,y[frog(x) & fly(y) & see(x,y,s)]l)  
( I sltry-to-catch(x,y,s)})  
In the most straightforward representation given in (15), the variables x and y in 
the matrix remain unbound, hence the indicated formula is not an acceptable 
re pre sen cation. 
In particular, we find adverbial quantifications also in sentences that 
arguably have no situation argument to quantify over, as in the following 
example, which expresses a quantification over three-coloured cats instead of 
situations: 
(16) Most of the time, a three-coloured cat is INFERTILE. 
Obviously, examples like (15) and (16) are donkey sentences, and we should 
expect that a combination of focus representation with a framework like 
Discourse Representation, File Change Semantics or another dynamic semantic 
representation is called for. 
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3. 	 The Structured Meaning Theory of Focus 
I have suggested that one shortcoming of Alternative Semantics is that we cannot 
refer directly to the meaning contribution of an item in focus. There is another 
framework for the semantic representation of focus, Structured Meanings, devel-
oped by von Stechow and Jacobs, whose basic assumptions can be traced back to 
Jackendoff (1972, Ch. 6). In this framework, focus induces a partition into a 
BACKGROUND part and a FOCUS part. which is commonly represented by a 
pair of semantic representations <B,F>, where B can be applied to F, and B(F) is 
the standard interpretation. Focus operators take such focus-background structures 
as arguments. The examples (4.a,b) given above would be treated as follows: 
(17) a. 	 ONLY(<h.introduced(j,x,b),s>) 
b. ONLY(d.P.P(j), h.introduced(x,s,b>) 
Assuming the following meaning postulate for ONLY 
(18) 	 ONLY(<B.F>) :H B(F) & VX!XEALT(F) & B(X) -4 Xc.=FJ, 
where X is a variable of the type of F 
and ALT(F) is the set of alternatives to F. 
we get the following representations: 
(19) a. introduced(j.s.b) & Vx[xE ALT(s) & introduced(j,x,b) - x=sl 
b. introducedli,s,b) & VP[PE ALT(Ax.introduced(x,s,b)) & P(j) ~ 
P=Ax.introduced(x,s.b)I 
The Structured Meaning framework can capture complex foci (20.a, by list repre-
sentations) and multiple foci (20.b, by recursive focus-background structures). 
(20) 	 a. John only I introduced 8ILLF1 to SUEFl' 
ONLY(<AX•y.introduced(j,x,y), s•b>) 
b. Even JOHNr met only SUEr1 1 2 2 
EYEN(<Ax.ONLY(<Ay.met(x,y), s>),j>J 
Krifka (1992) has developed a framework in which examples of these types are 
analyzed in a compositional way. In this framework, the focus on a constituent 
with the semantic representation A introduces a focus-background structure with 
"empty" background, <AX.X, A>. where X is of the type of A. This focus-back-
ground structure is projected through semantic compositions. For example, if the 
original semantic composition rule called for application of B to A, then 
application of B to a structured meaning <AX.CD> will yield <AX[B(C)],D>. If 
the original rule called for application of A to 8, then application of the structured 
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meaning <'A.X.C.D> to B will yield <A.X[C(B)].D>. Thus, infonnation about the 
focus and the place in the background where it has to be interpreted is projected 
through semantic composition. Finally, focus-sensitive operators are applied to 
such background-focus structures. 
The Structured Meaning framework provides us with a more articulate 
representation of expressions with focus than Alternative Semantics, insofar as we 
can access the meaning of an item in focus directly. In general, Alternative 
Semantics representations can be derived from Structured Meaning 
representations, but not vice versa. And it seems that we will need this additional 
information provided by Structured Meanings in order to cover the exhaustive 
interpretations discussed in the last section. 
4. A Framework for Dynamic Interpretation 
In this section, I will develop a framework for dynamic interpretation to capture 
anaphoric bindings in quantificational structures (cf. section 2). It will be related 
to Rooth (1987), mainly because I feel that its representations render the 
underlying ideas most perspicuously. The main differences to Rooth (1987) are 
that I will work with partial assignment functions (cf. Heim 1983), and that I will 
assume indices for possible worlds to capture modal quantifications and, in 
general, the increase of propositional information. Furthermore, I will use some 
abbreviatory conventions that hopefully improve the readability of the fonnulas. 
Let us assume a countable infinite set of DISCOURSE REFERENTS (or 
INDICES) DR, for which I use natural numbers L 2, 3 etc. Let us call the domain 
of entities D, and let G be the set of ASSIGNMENT FUNCTIONS, that is, the set 
of partial functions from DR to D: G = U{G'l3X[X~DR & G'=Dx]J. If g is an 
assignment function and dis an index in its domain, then I will write gd instead of 
g(d). Two assignment functions g,k are said to be COMPATIBLE, g""k, iff they 
are identical for their shared domain: g=k iff \id[dE DOM(g) & dE DOM(k)-, 
gd=kd]. The AUGMENTATION of g with k, g+k, is defined as guk, if 
DOM(g)nDOM(k) =$, and undefined otherwise. 
I will use the following notations for VARIANTS of assignment functions; 
contrary to usual conventions, they will denote sets of assignment functions. First, 
g[d] should be the set of assignment functions that is like g with the addition that 
they map the index d to some entity in D, that is, g[d] = {kl3xf xe D & 
k=g+{ <d,x> J] J. Second, g[d/a] should be the set of assignment functions that are 
like g with the addition that they map the index d to the entity a, that is, g[d/a] = 
Iklk=g+ I<d,a> 11; note that this will be a singleton set. Be aware that these 
notations are defined only if de DOM(g). The two notations can be combined; for 
example, g[ l/a,2,3/b] stands for {kl3x[xE D & k=g+( <l,a>,<2,x>,<3,b>J]l. 
The interpretation of natural-language expressions will, in general, be with 
respect to an INPUT ASSIGNMENT, an OUTPUT ASSIGNMENT, and a 
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POSSIBLE WORLD. NPs are related to discourse referents; I assume that their 
syntactic indices are interpreted as semantic indices. Indefinite NPs bear indices 
that are new with respect to the input assignment, definite NPs have old indices, 
and quantificational NPs have new indices that are "active" only within the scope 
of quantification. Also, episodic verbs introduce discourse referents for situations; 
they are, in general, new. 
For objects I will use variables x, y, ... , for situations s, s', ... , for possible 
worlds w. I assume a relation then for situations; s-then-s' means that the 
situations is followed by the situations', and that both situations together form a 
larger, coherent situation. Worlds determine the meanings of constants; I assume 
that constants, in general, have a world argument, which will be written as a 
subscript. I use v as a meta-variable over vectors of individual terms of length :?. 0. 
I use Q, Q' etc. as variables for entities of type ( <g,k,w,v>I ... J, T, T' etc. as a 
variable for entities of type A.Q. {<g,k, w,v>I...). and X,Y for variables of any type. 
For assignments I use variables g,h,k,i,j,f. Semantic combinations are typically by 
functional application. To save space, I will write tupels without commas; for 
example, instead of <g,k,w,y,k.,,s> I will write <gkwyk.,s>. 
Indices of NPs are introduced by determiners, the functional heads of NPs. 
Indices of indefinite determiners are new, whereas indices of definite NPs and 
pronouns are old. NPs are of a type that maps tupels <gkwxv> to tupels <gkwv>, 
that is, they reduce the arguments of the verbal predicate, xv, by one to v. In gene-
ral, I assume that the first available entity variable is bound, which implies that 
grammatical functions are encoded se~uentially. 
The situation variable of an episodic verb is bound by an operator that intro-
duces a new index for that situation. This operator may be associated with the 
syntactic position of INFL as the functional head of a sentence, and therefore I 
will attach the corresponding syntactic index to the finite verb (cf. Kratzer 1989, 
who suggests that tense, a feature of INFL, specifies and binds the Davidsonian 
argument). INFL can be applied at different stages of the syntactic derivation. In 
particular, it might be applied as the last operator, or it might be applied before the 
subject. In this way, internal subjects and external subjects in the sense of Kratzer 
(1989) and Diesing (1990) can be modelled. Tense will be disregarded through-
out. 
The following example shows the treatment of indefinite NPs and sentences 
with transitive verbs. I will use capital letters in brackets, like [Al, as abbrevia-
tion. 
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see, I<ggwyxs>lsee (x,y,s)}, = [AlI w 
I fly, { <ggwx>lny(x) J, [BJ 
I I
I I a
3
, A.Q'A.Q.{ <gkwv>l:3h3j[<ghwh >E Q' & je h(l] & <jkwh v>e Q]), =[CJ 
I I 1 3 3 
I a fly, [ C]([B ]), 
3I / A.Q.{<gkwv>13h[heg[3]&nyw(h )&<hkwh v>eQ]), [DJ3 3
see a fly, [D]([A]) = {<gkwxs>lke g[31 & fly (k3) & see (x,k ,s)), = [El3 w 3I w • 
I tFL2, A.Q. { <gkwv>l3h[he g[2] & PAST(g) & <hkwvh2>e Q] J, [Fl 
aw a fly, [FJ([E]), { <gkwx>lke g[2,3] & fly jk ) & seew(x,k ,k ) J
2 3 3 3 21
I a frog, A.Q. { <gkwv>l3h[he g[ I] & frogjh ) & <hkwh v>e Ql)
I i 1 1 1 
a1 frog saw2 a fly 3, 
I<gkw>lke g[l,2,3] & frog)k ) & nyw(k ) & seew(k ,k ,kz)}, = [GJ1 3 1 3
The next example shows the treatment of anaphoric reference. As men-
tioned above, definite NPs and pronouns presuppose that their index is already in 
the domain of the input assignment. Similarly, the situation index of an episodic 
verb might indirectly refer to some situation index introduced before, insofar as its 
situation index is located after that previous index (see Partee 1984 for temporal 
anaphora in narrative discourses). I assume here that the INFL operator may have 
two indices, one referring to an antecedent situation index, and the other 
representing its own situation. Assuming that in the following sentence, which 
continues example (21), it refers to the frog, the fly refers to the fly, and INFL 
refers to a situation that follows the seeing situation, we get the following 
interpretation: 
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(22) It caught
2
. the3 fly.1 4 
catch, { <gkwyxs>lcatch (x,y,s)) I w 
I the, fly, AQ. { <gkwv>lny (g3l & <gkwg3v>E Q) I ; . w 
catch the3 fly, { <ggwxs>lny (g1 ) & catch (x,g3,s))I w _ w 
INFL, 
4
, AQ.{ <gkwv>l:lh[hE g[4] & g -then-g & <hkwvh >E Q]}J 
1 4 4I ; .. 
caught • the3 fly,2 4 
J { <gkwx>lkE g[4 I & ny (g ) & k,-then-k & catch (x,k,,k ) II w _ 1 .. 4 w _ 4
J it
1
, AQ.{<gkwv>kgkwg v>EQ)
I ; 1
it
1 
caught
2
.
4 
the3 fly, 
{ <gkw>lkE g[4] & k -then-k & nyjk ) & catchjk ,kyk )), = [HJ2 4 3 1 4
We can combine the first sentence with the second one by dynamic conjunction, 
for which I will use the semicolon. 
(23) 
A frog saw, a, fly, [GII 1 . . 
It caught .4 the fly, [HJJ 1 2 3I ; 
A frog saw a fly. It caught the fly. [GJ;[HJ1 2 3 1 4 2 
{ <gkw>l:lh[<ghw>E [G] & <hkw>E [HJ]} 
= { <gkw>lkE g[] ,2,3,4] & frogjk ) & nyw(k) & sawjk ,k ,k)
1 1 3
& catch)k ,kyk ) & k -then-k )1 4 2 4 
Quantified NPs do not introduce any anaphoric possibilities beyond their scope. 
that is, their input assigment and output assignment are the same. They are "tests", 
according to Groenendijk & Stokhof ( 1991 ). For example, the meaning of the 
determiner mostct can be given as follows: 
(24) mos/ct: 
AQ'AQ. { <ggwv>IMOST( { xl:lh,k[hE g[d/x] & <hkwx>E Q'J)) 
( { xl:lh,k,j[hE g[d/x] & <hjwx>E Q' & <jkwxv>E QI I)) 
See Chierchia (1990) for the main lines of this reconstruction of quantification 
with "built-in" conservativity. It represents the "weak" reading, as identified by 
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Rooth (1987), Kadmon (1987), and Schubert & Pelletier (1989). In terms of the 
standard example Every farmer who owns a donkey bears it we get a reading 
where it is sufficient that every farmer who owns a donkey beats at least one 
donkey that he owns. The STRONG INTERPRETATION -- that every farmer 
who owns a donkey must beat every donkey he owns -- can be generated with a 
slightly different scheme for quantifier meanings: 
(25) 	 mosfd 
11.Q'AQ. ( <ggwv>I MOST( ( xl3h,k[he g[d/x) & <hkwx>e Q'J J) 
({xlVh,j[he g[d/x] & <hjwx>e Q'-+ 3k.<jkwxv>e QJ})} 
So far, we have construed the dynamic meaning of discourses. The truth condi-
tions for discourses are given by existential closure over the assignments and the 
world arguments with respect to the "actual" world: A text A is true with respect 
to the world w iff there are assignments g, k such that <gkw>E A. And A is true 
w.r.t. an input assignment g and a world w iff there is an output assignment k such 
that <gkw>EA. 
5. Stuctured Meanings in the Dynamic Framework: The Case of "Only" 
Let us now enrich the framework of the last section with structured meanings. 
This is fairly straightforward -- we might assume pairs of meanings <B,F>, where 
B and Fare dynamic. However, we must reconsider the notion of alternatives to 
the focus meaning. 
In a dynamic framework, the meaning of a focus constituent will naturally 
be dynamic. We indeed need dynamic foci, as they may exhibit anaphoric 
bindings: 
(26) 	 - Did John introduce every lady to her partner at left and her partner at 
right? 
John only introduced every lady to fher _ partner at LEFTJF 1 12 
In the given context, the alternatives are anaphorically related to every lady. 
Furthermore, the choice of alternatives itself is dependent on the context in which 
the expression in focus is evaluated, as it will vary for different contemplated 
ladies. I will capture this dependency of the alternative sets to a focus Fon an in-
put assignment g by the notation ALT/F). 
Since the elements of alternative sets are dynamic, we must take care that 
they do not introduce their own binding possibilities and lead to an unwelcome 
inflation of alternative sets. For example, assume that that Mary 1 and the1 woman 
with a 2 hat refer to the same person (but, of course, with different anaphoric 
potential). Obviously, we must exclude that the dynamic meaning of both NPs are 
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in the same alternative set. In general, we want that all proper alternatives to a 
focus meaning refer, in the given input context, to an entity that is different from 
the entity to which the focus meaning refers. with respect to the input context. 
The analysis for only that is closest to the non-dynamic counterpart (cf. 27) 
is the following (again, I assume for simplicity that only is a sentence operator): 
(27) 	 ONLY(<B,F>) = 
{ <gkw>l<gkw>E B(F) & \iX,h[XE AL\(F) & <ghw>E B(X)-, X=F]) 
The problem with this formulation, however, is that we take the alternatives with 
respect to the global input assignment g. What we would like to have is 
alternatives with respect to the local input assignment at which the focus is 
interpreted, as the discussion of sentences like (26) shows. A treatment of only 
that works with local alternative selection is the following, 
(28) 	 ONLY(<B,F>) = 
(i) 	 B(Fn( <gkwv>l\iQ\ik[Qe ALT/F) & <gkwv>E Q-, Q=F]) ), 
if F is of type I<gkwv>L.) 
(ii) 	 B(FnAQ.( <gkwv>l'v'T\ik[Te ALT/F) & <gkwv>eT(Q)-, T=Fll), 
if F is of type AQ. { <gkwv>I. .. ) . 
in which the intersection of functional expressions is the type-lifted version of 
standard intersection: AnB =AX[A(X)nB(X)J. For simplicity, I assume again that 
only is a sentential operator; the treatment as a VP operator is quite 
straightforward. (See Krifka (1992) for further discussion.) 
6. 	 Focus-Sensitive Quantification 
Let us return to focus-sensitive adverbial quantification. As a meaning rule for 
most of the time, I would like to propose the following: 
(29) 	 MOSTLY(<B,F>) = 
I<ggw>I MOST({ hl3f[ f=g+h & <gfw>E 
B(( <ggwv>13Q3j[QE ALT (F) & <gjwv>E QJ))J)) 
({ hl3i[i"'g+h & <giw>e ONLY(~B.F>)J}) J  
if Fis of a type { <gkwv>I. .. }  
That is, most of the time expresses a quantification over augmentations h of the 
input assignment g. As restrictor we take all the cases in which the input g and the 
output f, f=g+h, satisfy the background applied to some alternative of F, where the 
set of alternatives is again taken with respect to that input assignment at which the 
focus constituent is interpreted. We prevent the alternatives from introducing their 
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own binding possibilities by binding the assignment j existentially -- in a sense, 
we skip over the indices introduced within the focus. As matrix we take the cases 
in which g and g+h satisfy the background applied to the focus directly, and in 
which the focus is the only item among the alternatives that yields the required 
result. Actually, we have to introduce an assignment i that is compatible with g+h, 
as the focus might introduce its own binding possibilities that are not captured yet 
by h. 
The meaning rule in (29) gives the exhaustive interpretation. The non-
exhaustive interpretation can be specified by changing the second argument of 
MOST to the somewhat simpler {hl:3i[i"-'g+h & <giw>E B(F)l }. 
Let us look at some examples to see this meaning rule at work. I will 
compute the exhaustive interpretation. 
(30) Most of the time, a frog that sees a, fly {climbs A a REED]F
1 2 2 5 
a frog that sees a fly, AQ. {<gkwv>l:3h[he gl 1,2,3] & frogw(b) &1 2 3 
Hy (h,)&see (h ,h"h,)&<hkwh v>eQJ),=1I]II w ., w 1 ••• 1
I climb a reed, {<gkwxs>lkeg[5]&reed (k ) & climb (x,k"s)), =[JI5 5I I . w • .,w 
I [climb a,. REED Jr, dQ.Q, [JJ>I I . 
I I INFL ;l,Q. {<gkwv>l:3hlhe g[4J&g -then-g & <hkwvh >E Q]}. =[KJ
2 4
, 
I I1 · 1 4 4 
I )climbs2.4 a5 REED]", <[K],[J]> 
a frog that sees, a fly [climbs, a REED]., <A.Q.[I]([Kl(Q)), [J]>
1 1 4 1I - . .. . • 
I most of the time, A<B,F>.MOSTLY(<B,F>) 
I t 
most of the time, a frog that sees a fly [climbs .4 a REEDJF,1 2 3 2 5 
{<ggw>IMOST( {hl:3f[f=g+h & <gfw>E [IJ(!Kl( {<ggwxs>l:3Q:3j[Q E ALT/[JD 
& <gjwxs>eQJ} ))J)) 
(! hl:3ijizg+h & <giw>E ONLY(<A.Q[lj([Kj(Q)), [JJ>)})) 
Where the first argument of MOST reduces to: 
Ihl:3f[f=g+h & fe gf 1,2,3,4] & frog)t) & ny"(f3) & seew(f1JJ) 
& f
2
-then-f4 & :3Q:3j(Qe ALT/[J]) & <fjwf/4>E QI]} 
and the second argument of MOST reduces to: 
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{ hl3i[i"-'g+h & <giw>E [I]([KJ([J]n{ <gkwxs>IVQ\;fk[QE ALT/[J]J & 
<gkwxs>e Q ~ Q=[Jj] }))I) 
(hl3i3j[i"-'g+h & je g[l,2,3,4] & frogjj ) & flyw(j ) & seew(jl'j3,j2) &1 3
kthen-j & iej[5] & reedw(i ) & climbw(jl'i ,j ) & '1;/Qvk[QE ALT/(JJ)4 5 5 4 
& <jkwj
1
j
4
>E Q ~ Q=[J]l]}  
We get a dynamic meaning that accepts those input functions g, without changing 
them, and worlds w such that: 
- most augmentations h of g such that f=g+h and f is a frog, f is a fly, f sees f1 3 1 3 
in a situation f
2
, and there is a situation f occuring after f such that f does
4 2 1 
something that is an alternative to climbing a reed in f ,
4
- are such that they can be extended to i, where i contains a j such thatj (=f) is a 1 
frog, j (=f ) is a fly, j sees j in j ( =f ), j ( =t) is a situation following j
2
, j
3 3 I 3 2 2 4 	 1 
climbs a reed i in j , and climbing a reed is the only thing j does in j among the
5 4	 1 4 
alternatives, in the given context j. 
In this formalization, then, one problem we found with the treatment in 
Rooth ( 1985) is solved: We can express quantifications over cases, not only 
quantifications over situations. Note that any bindings between elements in the 
background and elements in the focus are only expressed within the second 
argument of MOST. 
What about the problem of exhaustivity? This is taken care of by the 
operator ONLY To see how things work. let us have a look at the treatment of 
example (10). Here, the item in focus is a term, John, which is not of a type for 
which the meaning rule for most of the time was defined in (29). Terms are of a 
type represented by AQ. { <gkw>I. .. Q ... l, where Q stands for the verbal predicate 
to which the term is applied. As in (48), we have to introduce in the restrictor 
some existentially bound assignment j that allows us to skip over the indices 
introduced by the item in focus. But in this case, we must make sure that we do 
not skip over the indices introduced by the verbal predicate for which Q stands for 
-- that is, we have to exempt indices that are introduced within Q. A meaning rule 
for most of the time that does that is the following one. The relevant part is the 
formula :lv[<gkwv>e QJ, which guarantees that indices introduced within Q are 
not affected. 
(31) 	 (<ggw>I 
MOST( ( hl3f!f=g+h & <gfw>E B(AQ. { <gkwv>l3v[<gkwv>E QI & 
3Tijlj=f & Te ALT (F) & <gjwv>ET(Q)] ))])) 
({hl3i[izg+h & <giw>J ONLY(<B,F>JI)) l  
if Fis of a type AQ. ( <gkwv>I... J  
Let us now have a look at our example. I change it slightly to one that contains an 
indefinite NP in focus instead of a name, in order to show the point of the above 
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definition. Imagine that little Mary has many stuffed animals, among them several 
teddy bears. She likes to take one of them to bed with her. Let us look at the 
following sentence in this context: 
(32) Most of the time, Mary takes [a TEDDY bear]F to bed with her 
j teddy bear, AQ. { <gkwv>l3h[he g[3] & teddyjh ) & <hkwv>E QJ), [L]3 3
a3 TEDDY bear], <AT.T, [L]>1
I take to bed, { <ggwyxs>ltake (x,y,s) }, [M]I ; w 
take [a1 TEDDY bear] to bed, <AT.T([M]), [LJ> I .  
I INFLz, AQ.{ <gkwv>l3h[hE g[2] & <hkwh2>E Q] I  
I / 
takes
2 
[a
3 
TEDDY bear] to bed,  
I <AT. I<gkwv>l3h[hE g[2] & <hkwvh >E (T([M]))J}, [L]>  
I 2
I ~ary1, AQ. { <gkwv>lg 1=mw & <gkwg1v>E QJ}, = [NJ 
Mary takes [a TEDDY bear] to bed,
1 2 3I d.T.[NJ({ <gkwv>l3h[hE g[2] & <hkwvh 0 >E (T([M]))Jl), [LJ> I . 
I most of the time, A<B,F>.MOSTLY(<B,F>) 
I ; 
most of the time, Mary takes [a TEDDY bear] to bed,
1 2 3 
MOSTLY(<AT.[N]({ <gkwv>l3h[he g[2] & <hkwvh 0 >e (T([M]))])), [L]>), 
= { <ggw>I • 
MOST( { hl3f[f=g+h & <gfw>E [NJ ( { <gkwv>l3h[hE g[2 I & 
<hkwvh2>E ({ <gkwxs>l3y'x's'[<gkwy'x's'>E [MJJ & 3T3j[j=f 
& TE ALT ([L]) & <gjwxs>ET(IM])Jl)J))J))
8 
((hl3i[izg+h & <giw>E ONLY(<AT.[N]({ <gkwv>l3h[he g[2] & 
<hkwvh
2
>E(T([MJ))ll), [L]>)l})} 
The first argument of MOST reduces to: 
{ hl3f[f=g+h & g =mw & fE g[2] & 3y,x,s[takew(x,y,s)] & 3T3j[j=f &1
Te ALTg([L]) & <fjwg k >e T([M])]JJ)1 2
The second argument of MOST reduces to: 
230 
{hl:Ji[i,~g+h & g =mw & 3f[fE g[2] & iE h[3] & teddyw(i ) & takew(g ,i3'f ) &1	 3 1 2
VT'v'j[TE ALT/[L]) & <fjwg/2>E T([M]) ~ T=[L]]]) 
This accepts input assignments g, without changing them, and worlds w such that: 
- most augmentations h of g with DOM(h) = {21 and f=g+h such that f1 (=g1) is 
Mary, f is a situation where f takes something to bed, and f takes some
2 1 	 1 
alternative to a teddy bear to bed 
are such that they can be extended to i, where g
1 
(= i
1
) is Mary, i
3 
is a teddy bear, 
g takes i to bed in situation i (= f ), and g doesn't take any alternative to a 
1 3 	 2 2 1 
teddy bear to bed in i
2
. The alternatives here are with respect to an input 
assignment f that contains reference to the situation. 
This gives us the right reading. We effectively quantify only over situations 
in which Mary takes something to bed with her. as the augmentations h just 
capture the situation variable. A simpler paraphrase would be: Most of the time 
when Mary took something to bed with her, she took a teddy bear and only a 
teddy bear with her. The crucial difference to the extension of Rooth's treatment 
developed in section (3) is that we do not express uniquess through the situation 
variable, but more directly by referring to the constituent in focus. In order to do 
so. we have to IDENTIFY THE CONTENT OF THE ITEM IN FOCUS. Hence, 
we make use of the additional information that Structured Meaning represen-
tations provide us. compared to Alternative Semantics. 
7. 	 Conditionals 
In this section, I will discuss certain effects of focus in conditional sentences. In 
conditionals the antecedent clause should be part of the restrictor of a quantifier, 
and hence be part of the background. Now, this clause can have its own focus-
background structure, which has an interesting effect on quantification. Kadmon 
(1987) observed that different accents within the antecedent clause lead to 
different types of asymmetric quantification: It seems that the quantification is not 
over all the indices provided by the antecedent clause (cf. also Kratzer I 989, 
Heim 1990). If we paraphrase usually by most, then we get contrasts like the 
following one: 
(33) 	 a. If a painter lives in a VILLAGE, it is usually nice. 
"Most painters that live in a village live in a nice one" 
b. 	 If a PAINTER lives in a village, it is usually nice.  
"Most villages in which there lives a painter are nice"  
Recently two theories have been put forward to explain these differences, namely 
Kratzer (1989) and Chierchia (1990); see also de Swart (1991) for a comparison 
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of those theories, According to Kratzer, we have existential closure over the VP 
of the if-clause, which prevents the indices of NPs within the VP to be quantified 
over. This principle must be supplemented by assumptions that the subject can be 
interpreted VP-internally, and that constituents that are orginally VP-internal may 
be scrambled outside of the VP. thus escaping existential closure. In Krifka 
( 1992). I discuss some of the problems of this approach. According to Chierchia 
( 1990), quantification is only over topical constituents, which typically are 
unaccented. One problem with this explanation is that in languages that have an 
explicit topic marker, like Japanese or Korean. NPs marked as topics do not occur 
within antecedent clauses. 
I think that what matters is not topicality, but being pan of the background 
of a background-focus structure. The right generalization seems to be that indices 
introduced by expressions in the BACKGROUND of a conditional clause are 
BOUND BY THE QUANTIFIER. whereas the indices introduced by expressions 
in the FOCUS are subjected to existential closure and thus are PREVENTED 
FROM BEING QUANTIFIED OYER. Given that analysis, we would get the 
right readings if. in (33.al, a painter is in the background. and in (33.b), a rillage 
is in the background. Actually. (33.b) would have at least two different 
interpretations: either the meaning of a village is the only item in the restrictor, or 
both /ires and a \'ii/age are in the restrictor. 
We can express the influence of focus-background articulation in 
conditional clauses with the following meaning rule: 
(34) 	 MOSTLY(if <B,F> then CJ: 
{<ggw>IMOST( {hl::lf[ f=g+h & <gfw>E B({ <ggwv>l::lj[ <gjwv>E Fl J)] } ) 
({ hl::lk[k"-g+h & <gkw>E [B(F):C]}) ).  
if Fis of a type { <gkwv>I. .. }.  
That is, MOSTLY(i/ <B,F> then C) is true of input assignments g and worlds w 
iff most ways h to augment g ~uch that the input g, the output g+h and the world 
w satisfy the background applied to the focus (where indices introduced within 
the focus are existentially bound) are such that g+h can be extended to k such that 
the input g, the output k and the world w satisfy the background applied to the 
focus, composed with the consequent C. The essential part of this meaning rule is 
that indices that are introduced within the focus are existentially bound with 
narrow scope in the semantic representation of the antecendent, hence they are not 
accessible to the main quantifier. Let us discuss an example: 
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(35) Most of the time, if al frog [sees2 a, FLY]F. itl catches1A it.1, 
[ see a, FLYl ,. <AQ.Q, ( <gkwxs>lkE g[3 I & seejx,k,,s) & flyw(k) )>.1I <AQ.Q, [OJ>  
I 
I INFL,, AQ.{ <gkwv>l3h[hE g[2] & <hkwvh,>E QI}, I ; . . 
[sees, a, FLY],., <AQ.{ <gkwv>l3h[hE g[2) & <hkwvh,>E QI}. [01>I . . . 
I a frog, AQ.{ <gkwv>l3h[hE g[ l] & frog)h ) & <hkwh v>E Qll
I ; 1 1 1
a 1 frog [sees2 a, FLY]F' <AQ.{<gkwv>l3h[hEg[J,2J & frogw(h)I & <hkwh vh,>EQ]I, ]0)>, <[P],(0]>
1I • 
it catches .4 it3,I 1 2I \ <gkw>lkE gf41 & k2-then-k4 & catchw(k 1,k ,k} }. = [QII 3
I ~nost of the time 
most of the time. if a frog [sees a FLYJF, it catches A it1 2 3 1 2 3 
{<ggw>IMOST( {hl3f[f=g+h & <gfw>E [Pl([O])  
( {hl3k[k~g+h & <gkw>E [[P](]O]):{QJJ l)}  
= I<ggw>IMOST({ hl3f[f=g+h & fE g[ 1,2] & frog"(f ) & f!31 & 1
seew(f) .f} & flyJi,)]]})3
({hl3k[k~g+h & kE g[l.2.3,4[ & frogw(k ) & fly)k,)
1
& see)k .kyk ) & k -then-k & catch(k .k,,k)I I)}1 2 2 4 1
This accepts input assignments g. without changing them, and worlds w such that 
most extensions h of g. where the domain of h is ( 1.2} and h
1 
is a frog that can be 
extended to j. where j is a fly and h is a seeing of j by h , are such that they can
3 2 3 1
be extended to k, where k (=\) is a frog, k., is a fly. k (= h ) is a seeing of k, by
1 2 2
k • and k is a situation following k in which k catches k
1
. This gives us the 
2 4 2 1 
intuitively correct interpretation of the most prominent reading: we quantify over 
frogs h and situations h in which h sees a fly. 
1 2 1 
The semantic rule (34) is restricted to foci of non-functional types. How can 
we extend it to cover cases where, e.g., an NP is in focus. that is, an expression of 
a type AQ. I<gkwv>L .. )? The extension is relatively straightforward. However, we 
have to make sure that indices that are introduced within Qare accessible for the 
quantifier, that is, we have to exempt them from existential quantification This i~ 
done by the following meaning rule: 
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(36) 	 { <ggw>IMOST( { hl3f[f=g+h & <gfw>E B(AQ. I<gkw>l3v[ <gkwv>E QJ & 
3j[j=k & <gjw>E F(Q)] f) J)) 
( { hl3k[kccg+h & [B(F):CI f)),  
if Fis of a type AQ.{ <gkwv>I .. Q.. J  
See Krifka (1992) for further examples and for a discussion of some observations 
by Kratzer (1989) and de Swart (I 991) that quantificational adverbials need a 
variable to quantify over. 
8. 	 Final Remarks 
In this paper, I tried to give a formal account of the influence of focus on quantifi-
cation, in particular on the semantic partition into restrictor and matrix. This was 
carried out in a framework that combined the Structured Meaning representation 
of focus with a version of Dynamic Semantics to capture anaphoric bindings. In 
developing it, we had to pay attention to the notion of focus alternatives within a 
dynamic setting. 
There are several areas that need elaboration. One is that I assumed that 
focus-sensitive operators apply to sentences. This is not true in general: Parucles 
like 011/y and quantifiers like always clearly can be VP operators. It is relatively 
straightforward to generalize the semantic types of these operators such that they 
can be applied to VP meanings of the type { <gkwx>I ... }. 
One point which I have suppressed in this paper is that focus can have dif-
ferent sources it might be focus associated with an overt operator, or it might be 
focus associated with the illocutionary operator, so-called "free" focus. We can 
assume that it is always the focus associated to the highest operator that is spelled 
out by sentence accent (cf. Jacobs 1991, Krifka 1991). This can easily lead to 
confusion. In the following example. focus on SUE does not indicate that this 
phrase is interpreted in the matrix; John is interpreted in the matrix, as focus on 
SUE is licensed by the illocutionary operator. 
(37) 	 !Did Mary always take JOHN to the movies'!! 
No, SUE always took John to the movies. 
Finally, we might question whether the restrictor of an adverbial quantifier is 
always given by focus-background structures (if not provided by the context). 
There is an interesting case involving relative clauses which Anna Szabolcsi 
brought to my attention with examples like (38.a): 
(38) 	 a. We should thank the man whom Mary always took to the movies. 
b. We should thank the man whom Mary only took to the movies. 
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(38.a) can be interpreted as: "We should thank the man such that, if Mary took 
someone to the movies, it was him". But note that the representative of the man 
within the relative clause, whom (or the empty element coindexed with whom) is 
not stressed. We might say that relative pronouns, let alone empty elements, 
cannot bear stress, but still may be in focus. However, if this is so, then only in 
(38.b) should be associable with the object NP, yielding the reading "We should 
thank the man such that Mary took only HIM to the movies", which is not avail-
able. Szabolcsi suggests that the creation of an empty element by WH-movement 
is crucial for the construction of the restrictor, which in our example yields the 
semantic representation h3s[took(m,x,s)]. Szabolcsi (1985), who discusses the 
focus-sensitivity of superlatives, takes the creation of empty elements as the 
crucial property even in the cases with focus, following the focus theory of 
Chomsky (1977), according to which focus implies Wh-movement. However. 
assuming movement is problematic, as it would not abide by syntactic island 
constraints (cf. Jackendoff 1972, Krifka 1991 ). 
There is another type of case where we might question how predictive focus 
is in determining semantic partition of adverbial quantifiers. Schubert & Pelletier 
( 1989), in their discussion of "reference ensembles" (roughly, restrictors), give a 
number of examples for which they do not claim that focus plays a role. One of 
their examples is 
(39) Cats usually land on their feet. 
Note that we could explain this example in terms of background-focus structure: 
The main accent probably is onfeer, hence we have Cats usually land /011 rheir 
FEETJF as a plausible analysis, which would generate the reading: Usually. when 
cats land on something (a body part of them), then they land on their feet. Howev-
er, it seems that (39) has a very similar interpretation with the whole VP land on 
rheirfeet in focus. In this case, Schubert & Pelletier's suggestion that PRESUP-
POSITIONS may furnish the reference ensembles (i.e., the restrictor of the quan-
tification) seems to be on the right track, as every case of landing on one's feet 
presupposes that one is coming down in the first place. 
I don't see Schubert & Pelletier's presuppositional theory and the focus 
theory proposed here as necessarily being in conflict with each other. It seems 
plausible to assume that the background of a focus-background structure provides 
or identifies the presuppositions of an expression. If this is so, the role of focus-
background structures in semantic partitions could ultimately be subsumed under 
a general theory of the role of presupposition in quantification. 
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